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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT ELTON WOODALL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8540 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
From the facts of the case there seems no question but 
what a trailer house was utilized as a bar and house of ill 
fame in Grand County, Utah from on or about October 29, 
1954 to December 23rd of that year. The trailer house was 
divided in two sections, one for each purpose; at the outset 
Jerry McAllister and Bobby Miller were the "resident oper-
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ators". There is some conflict in the evidence as to whether 
or not Robert Elton Woodall, defendant and appellant, was 
also an occupant of the premises. The fact that Woodall 
was in or about the premises in one capacity or another 
during all of the period of time involved is not controverted 
by any of the testimony. When Jerry McAllister departed 
the county, state, and trailer, the state complained that 
Woodall induced, persuaded, encouraged and enticed Ida 
E. Duclo, also known as Pat Morgan, a female person to 
become a prostitute. As a result thereof, Robert Elton 
Woodall was convicted of pandering and thereupon sen-
tenced to a term in the state prison for not to exceed twenty 
years. 
"Jerry" was the blond, "Bobby" the redhead, "Pat" the 
brunette (R. 7). We shall hereinafter refer to these ladies 
of the maison de joie by their own adopted nicknames. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pat, the victim, age 22, was employed at a resort some 
fifteen or so miles out of Moab, Utah, known as the Hole 
in the Rock; she had been so employed from about the last 
week in September to about the first week of December, 
l 954 ( R. 6) . Pat met the defendant at her work some time 
in October of that year when he brought two girls in for 
a meal (R. 6). On December 12, 1954, Pat was among the, 
unemployed, the cafe apparently having ceased operating 
( R. 9) . On the night of December 12th Pat went to work 
for the defendant as a barmaid selling whiskey at a wage 
of $5.00 per night plus 25c on the "Bee shots"; she re· 
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"n~ mained so employed for two nights. Pat's place of employ-
ment was a trailer house located on "Blue Hill" a spot some 
1n\1 
six miles closer to Moab than the Hole in the Rock. Pat's w~ 
co-tenant of the trailer was "Bobby" (R. 56) whose ad-
'a~ 
mitted occupation was prostitution ( R. 45) . 1\ml~l 
:~ Bobby had known the defendant since May or June of 
1ineH 1954; she had first met him in Las Vegas, Nevada (R. 43). 
~Ot!J 1 Bobby arrived in Moab the latter part of October, 1954, and 
!~ about the third week after that moved into the trailer (R. 
1~H 44). Bobby resided there with Jerry and the defendant 
~11 Robert Elton \Voodall (R. 44). 
Jerry was an alleged prostitute; (R. 56, 57) she ad-
mitted having been paid for her services as a prostitute (R. 
rt 91). Jerry had a bank account at the First National Bank 
fu~i of Moab in the name of Mrs. Joan Woodall ( R. 100) . Jerry 
00 left the State of Utah some time around the middle of De-
~~; 
d: 
cember (R. 91) ; prior thereto and while Jerry was living 
at the trailer the defendant was accustomed to leave some 
of his clothes at the trailer (R. 106). As heretofore stated, 
Pat replaced Jerry as a tenant of the trailer house ; as a 
barmaid on December 12th (R. 9), and as a prostitute on 
ood December 14th (R. 11, 12, 13). The police arrived at the 
scene on the 23rd day of December and then and there 001! 
terminated both girls' employment (R. 13). 
rKWitl 
~~~rr Pat was the first witness called by the State. Pat testi-
~illl~t fied as to her employment at the Hole in the Rock as a 
~~~ waitress, as to meeting the defendant and as to having 
rentro' accepted employment as a barmaid for the defendant at the 
yatl' trailer (R. 5, 11). Pat said the defendant asked her if she 
~"; ~ 
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4 
"wouldn't go ahead and work as a prostitute" (R. 11) and ,l 
that she told him "I would try anything once" (R. 11). Pat , 
and the defendant reached an agreement: Pat, 
"was to charge $10.00 * * * He showed me 
where to put the money in a little drawer and every-
thing. And I was to keep $5.00 and give him five" 
(R. 12). 
On cross examination, Pat was questioned about an alleged 
conversation had with Jerry in the presence of Pat's hus-
band; (R. 16). Pat denied having gone to Jerry seeking 
employment as a prostitute (R. 16). Pat denied having 
conversed with Bobby on the subject of prostitution before 
having gone to work at the trailer (R. 21). Pat denied 
having ever worked as a prostitute prior to her employment 
by the defendant as such (R. 18, 38). Mter her arrest, Pat 
was complained against as being a prostitute and she 
pleaded guilty to the charge (R. 41). 
"Bobby", was the next witness for the State. Bobby 
told of her acquaintance with the defendant, as to having 
lived in the trailer with Jerry and as to having occupied 
herself thereat as a prostitute (R. 42, 45). Bobby told of 
Pat's employment by the defendant as a barmaid at $5.00 
a night and 25c a "Bee" drink; (R. 46) and that Pat had 
"said that she would come down with the understanding 
that she was just to tend bar" (R. 47). Bobby testified as 
to Pat's having worked as a barmaid for a couple of days 
<R. 48) and then as to a conversation had in the trailer 
house on December 14th about Pat's "further employment" 
(R. 4R). Bobby, while addressing her Christmas cards, 
heard the defendant tell Pat that "since she'd been seen 
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1 around Moab with me (Bobby) and that I had such a bad 
reputation that her reputation was the same as mine now 
so she might as well go all the way. She'd get more money. 
There was more money in it that way" (R. 48). Bobby 
~ said that subsequent to this conversation Pat engaged in 
nl prostitution (R. 50, 75). The defendant came to the trailer 
house almost every day, according to Bobby, to see that they 
~~ had plenty of water or oil and butane; (R. 51) the defen-
~~ dant took his meals there (R. 51). Bobby said that neither 
·~ Pat nor Pat's husband had said in her presence that Pat 
lM had previously been a prostitute or he a hustler (R. 67). 
111 Bobby did not discuss with Pat the possibility of Pat's going 
1\~ to work as a prostitute (R. 68). Bobby did not recall Pat 
t!1UJ: coming to the trailer with her husband and having a con-
rm versation with Jerry (R. 71). Bobby was yet to be sen-
~ tenced on a charge of being a prostitute (R. 75) . 
The state called next Seth Wright, Sheriff, San Juan 
d County. The sheriff first knew Pat as a waitress at the 
m~ Hole in the Rock; (R. 77), he later arrested her at the 
!tdl trailer at Blue Hill (R. 77). 
lr~ Frank Pester, an investigator for the State Health De-
a~l partment V. D. Control was the next witness for the prose-
It~ cution (R. 81). He investigated the activities at the trailer 
e$1 on the nights of December 21st and 22nd and participated 
~ in the raid on December 23rd (R. 82). He found Bobby 
~~~~ and Pat at the trailer on these occasions (R. 82). He found 
tile~ that prostitution was being practiced thereat (R. 83). 
~~~~r 
naJ~ 
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The State Rested. 
The defense moved for a directed verdict of not guilty 
or to dismiss the information and the court denied the 
motion (R. 87, 88). The defense called as a witness Jerry 
( R. 88) . The witness was acquainted with the defendant, 
with Pat and Pat's husband and with Bobby (R. 88, 89). 
Jerry said that Pat came with her husband Duane to the 
trailer house, and that "Ida Duclo (Pat) asked me if she 
could come to work in the trailer as a prostitute and I said 
'no'. And she asked why. And I said 'I don't want anytking 
to do with turning a new girl out'. And Duane Duclo stepped 
in and said that Ida (Pat) had worked before. And I cuked 
her a few questions pertaining to prostitution and she 
couldn't answer them. And she started to cry and stepped 
out of the trailer and Duane went out with her" (R. 90). 
The defendant did errands for this witness while she was 
residing at the trailer house (R. 91). Jerry and Bobby lived 
at the trailer together; (R. 93) it was Jerry's trailer and 
she was in charge (R. 103). The defendant left clothes in 
the trailer house (R. 106, 107). Jerry departed, trailer and 
all, around the middle of December; (R. 104) she did not 
come back until the day preceding her being called as a 
witness (R. 105). Jerry was not in love with the defendant 
(R. 105) but she had called him on the telephone while he 
was in jail (R. 106) and had written him (R. 107), closing 
her letter as follows: ""Veil honey I better close now. Write 
to me please. I sure love you. Lots of love, Jerry" (R. 111). 
Jerry had wired the defendant for money (R. 114). Jerry 
expected to get the proceeds from the defendant's uranium 
claim; ( R. 115), the friendship she had for the defendant 
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developed because "he came across with his money easy" 
(R. 112). 
The defense called one Dan Gordon as a witness. Gor-
don was a trailer salesman (R. 116). He allegedly rented 
a trailer to Jerry, the rental to apply on the purchase price 
(R. 117). The witness stated that Jerry made all the rental 
payments but one; (R. 118) that the redheaded girl (Bob-
by) made the last payment which was made on December 
20th (R. 118). On cross examination Gordon said that Jerry 
put up collateral for the trailer, (R. 120) three diamond 
rings (R. 121). One was a man's ring-one and 75/100 
carats (R. 122)-this ring the witness was still holding 
(R. 123 j. The record is silent as to what became of the 
~ 
other two-presumably Jerry did not leave the rings be-
l:c 
hind as she did the trailer. 
Jerry was recalled to the witness stand for further 
~~ cross examination by the state. The defendant had given 
j Jerry the man's diamond ring as a present but for a consid-
j eration (R. 125). 
rJ!· Charles 0. Chapman, a fellow inmate of the defendant 
~~ at the Monticello bastille, was called for the defense. This 
~~ witness proffered testimony to the effect that Bobby had 
a~ visited the defendant at the jail and attempted to induce 
1~w!i the defendant to plead guilty and take the pressure off so 
~~~~ that Bobby and Pat would be turned loose (R. 125, 129). 
n~w.i The state called Mr. Frank Pester as a rebuttal witness and 
1
'lf the witness thought that Charles 0. Chapman was standing 
HI·' too far away from the defendant and Bobby to have over-
1lif> 
~a~ 
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heard the conversation between them to which Chapman 
had testified. 
Upon the evidence, instructions, and argument of 
counsel, the cause went to the jury. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
WANT OF CORROBORATION OF THE VIC-
TIM'S TESTIMONY. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY FAILING TO 
DEFINE TO THE JURY THE MEANING OF 
CRIMINAL INTENT. 
POINT III 
THE COURT SUFFICIENTLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY AS TO CORROBORATION OF THE 
VICTIM'S TESTIMONY. 
POINT IV 
REFUSAL OF DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3 AND 4 WAS NOT ER-
ROR. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
WANT OF CORROBORATION OF THE VIC-
TIM'S TESTIMONY. 
To sustain a conviction for pandering the testimony 
B( of the victim must be corroborated. State v. Smith, 2 U. 
ff;l 2nd 358, 284 P. 2d 246. We have no quarrel with this pro-
~(. nouncernent of the law for which defendant claims. How-
ever, there is nothing in State v. Smith, supra, which would 
indicate that the corroborative evidence required be other 
than that necessary under Section 77-31-18, U. C. A. 1953. 
Therefore, the corroboration need not go to all of the rna-
~; terial facts as testified by the victim, nor need it be suffi-
r;~: cient in itself to support a conviction; it may be slight and 
entitled to little consideration. It must connect the defen-
dant with the comrnrnission of the offense and be incon-
sistent with his innocence and must do more than cast a 
grave suspicion on the defendant all without the aid of the 
['[U testimony of the accomplice. State v. Vigil, . . U. . .. , 
·~ 260 P. 2d 539, and cases there cited. 
What, then, in this case, is the evidence completely 
aside from the testimony of the victim, Pat, which connects 
the defendant with the offense charged? 
:~ Bobby testified that Pat was employed by the defen-
T~ dant at a stipulated wage only to tend bar; that for two 
days Pat tended bar and did not become a prostitute until 
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after the defendant proposed to Pat that she do so and 
suggested that there would be more money for Pat in it 
that way. Bobby testified that the defendant attended the 
daily needs of the trailer house and that for a period he 
took his meals there. Bobby was not an accomplice and her 
testimony needed no corroboration and was alone suffi-
cient to prove the offense charged. State v. Davie, U. 
, 240 P. 2d 263. But there is m.ore. 
Jerry testified that prior to Pat's employment by the 
defendant Pat knew nothing of prostitution and could not 
answer questions pertaining thereto. Jerry testified that 
the defendant attended to errands for her while she was 
residing at the trailer ; that the defendant left his clothes in 
the trailer house when she was occupying the premises. 
Although Jerry claimed ownership of the trailer, she ad-
mitted that the large diamond ring used as collateral for 
the purchase of the trailer came from the defendant. The 
defense witness, Dan Gordon, testified as to the diamond 
ring, and as to the fact that Bobby, the redhead, made at 
least one payment on the trailer after Jerry had departed 
the state. There was abundant evidence to connect the 
defendant with the trailer house and with the goings on 
thereat. 
There was ample competent evidence adduced from 
which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant perpetrated the crime of pandering. When 
such competent evidence appears in the record, there can 
be no error in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal, State 
v. Peterson, . . U. . , 240 P. 2nd 504; or in refusing to 
grant a motion to dismiss. The rule applicable when a 
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motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of the 
evidence is, as stated by this court: 
"The rule which must be applied upon a motion 
to dismiss a criminal case is that all reasonable in-
ferences are to be taken in favor of the state, and 
only if the record itself reveals that no reasonable 
man could draw an inference of guilt therefrom is 
the trial court justified in taking the case from the 
jury." State v. Thatcher, 108 U. 63, 157 P. 2d 258. 
In State v. Penderville, 2 U. 2nd 281, 272 P. 2d 195, the 
court said: 
"It has been repeatedly held by this court that 
upon a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict of not 
guilty for lack of evidence that the trial court does 
not consider the weight of the evidence or credi-
bility of the witnesses, but determines the naked 
legal proposition of law, whether there is any sub-
stantial evidence of the guilt of the accused, and all 
reasonable inferences are to be taken in favor of 
the state. State v. Lewellyn, 71 Utah 331, 266 P. 
261; State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P. 2d 258; 
State v. Aures, 102 Utah 113, 127 P. 2d 872; State 
v. Peterson, . . Utah ... , 240 P. 2d 504. As is 
pointed out in one or more of these cases, the trial 
court has a discretion in the case of a motion for a 
new trial that it does not have in case of a motion 
to dismiss or to direct a verdict of not guilty." 
The trial court did not err in this case and could have 
]i· f: properly done only what it did do in denying the motion 
ili~ for directed verdict or to dismiss the information. 
j~i 
re~ 
le~ 
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POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY FAILING TO 
DEFINE TO THE JURY THE MEANING OF 
CRIMINAL INTENT. 
No instruction was requested of the court as to the 
meaning of "intent" or "criminal intent" as that word 
"intent" was used in Instruction No. 2 as given by the court. 
This court in such cases has said: 
"It is the court's duty to try the issues made 
by the parties and not to make cases for them. We 
have held that where instructions are palpably er-
roneous to such an extent that they would, if fol- ~ 
lowed by the jury, prevent a fair or proper determin-
ation of the issues, we may notice the error without 
exception having been taken. State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 
89, 60 P. 2d 952; State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P. 
2d 647. But we are aware of no holding that the 
mere failure to give an instruction which might have 
been given but which was not requested or called to 
the attention of the court, and no exception taken 
to the failure to give it will be noticed on appeal." 
State v. Peterson, supra, see also State v. 
Mitchell, . . U ... , 278 P. 2d 618, 622. 
The inquiry here then is: was the instruction so palpably 
erroneous that, if followed by the jury, it would prevent a 
fair or proper determination of the issues? We think not; 
specific intent was not an issue of the crime charged. The 
statutory offense was the act of inducing, persuading, en-
couraging or enticing the victim to become a prostitute; 
although all "common law crimes" consist of two elements, 
namely, the criminal act or omission and the mental ele-
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ment the legislature may dispense with necessity for a 
criminal intent and punish particular acts without regard 
to mental attitude of the doer. Simmons v. State, 10 So. 
2nd 436, 438, 151 Fla. 778. The defendants' cause was not 
prejudiced by the court's failure to define the meaning of 
"intent" ; no specific intent was necessary to constitute the 
offense. 
POINT III 
THE COURT SUFFICIENTLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY AS TO CORROBORATION OF THE 
VICTIM'S TESTIMONY. 
Appellant claims instruction No. 11 erroneous for the 
11
wm reason that the instructions permitted the jury to "specu-
1.~1f late as to what was meant by "corroborative" testimony. 
~.; For this contention appellant relies upon no authority other 
11W than the legal definition of "corroborative evidence". It m~t 
rtl& has been held that : 
"The word 'corroboration' is not one of techni-
cal meaning but is in ordinary use, and its meaning 
is generally understood, and the court is not required 
to instruct the jury what the word means." Austin 
v. State, 101 S. W. 1162, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 327. 
w~ 
1 ~ The general rule appears to be that terms in common use 
,iliiJII with well understood meaning need no special definition. 
~~· See American Digest System, Criminal Law, key 800(2). 
Further, here again, no such instruction was requested. 10~ 
Respondent's argument on Point II, supra, is equally applic-
rro.( 
able here. ·o~ 
roenW 
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POINT IV 
REFUSAL OF DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3 AND 4 WAS NOT ER-
ROR. 
Defendant requested the following instruction: 
"You are instructed that in order for defendant 
to be guilty as charged in the information on file 
herein, the State must have shown by the eviden~ 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant made Ida 
E. Duclo, also known as Pat A. Morgan, certain 
promises and inducements which she relied upon and 
which actually tended to cause her to become a pros-
titute. 
"If you find from the evidence that the said Pat 
Morgan, also known as Ida Duclo became a prosti-
tute without any promises or inducements which 
caused her to become such, then you must return a 
verdict in favor of defendant, not guilty." 
The court below was thus asked to instruct the jury that 
the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
promises and inducements made to the victim by the de-
fendant actually tended to cause her to become a prostitute. 
That is not the law in this jurisdiction and the instruction 
was properly refused; for: 
"Success is not a necessary component of the 
crime." State v. Gates, 118 U. 172, 221 P. 2d 878. 
Defendant also asked the court below to instruct the 
jury: 
"You are instructed that in ·order for you to 
find defendant guilty of pandering, under Section 
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76-53-8, U. C. A. 1953, you must find that defen-
dant's persuasions, inducements or suggestions, if 
any, were the efficient or moving cause in bringing 
about the illicit relations wherein, Ida E.. Duclo, also 
known as Pat A. Morgan, became a prostitute. 
"If you find from the evidence that the said 
Ida E. Duclo, also known as Pat A. Morgan, did not 
engage in illicit relations and became a prostitute 
because of anything defendant may have said to her, 
but rather that she became a prostitute upon her 
own volition and that she engaged in prostitution 
because of her own independent desire to do so, then 
you must find the issues in favor of defendant and 
return a verdict of not guilty." 
This instruction was objectionable for the identical reason; 
Ul 
it mattered not whether the defendant's persuasion, in-
ducements or suggestions did in fact cause the victim to 
become a prostitute any more than it mattered whether 
8he became one or not. 
~:~ Each party is entitled to his theory of the case which 
1t!l:l is supported by competent evidence, State v. Newton, 105 
U. 561, 144 P. 2d 290. An examination of the record in the 
~ri case, however, does not disclose any testimony or other 
ifu1i evidence which would sustain defendant's theory that the 
victim was already a prostitute; the presumption is that 
she was chaste before the defendant induced her to become 
l@ti 
J ~j\ a prostitute. State v. Smith, supra. The defendant's own 
witness, Jerry, testified that the victim knew nothing of 
n.4!'t prostitution even though she, Jerry, claimed that the vic-
tim's husband had contended that Pat had "worked" before. 
[orr There is no merit to the contention that the court should 
i~~ 
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have instructed the jury on the defendant's theory of the 
case in the absence of substantial evidence to sustain such 
theory. 
CONCLUSION 
The verdict should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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